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(NON)exISTeNCe OF BULGARIAN 
PARTY ‑BASeD eUROSCePTICISM – 
WHY SHOULD We CARe?
Euroscepticism is often linked to the disappointment with the outcomes of 
transition as well as overgrown expectations that accompanied the accession 
to the European Union. The main aim of the paper is to investigate if and how 
party -based Euroscepticism has been active in Bulgaria, a post -communist 
country in CEE and a member of the European Union since 2007. The pa-
per will present the rhetoric and characteristics of main Eurosceptic political 
parties in Bulgaria. Bulgarian public opinion used to be perceived as one of 
the most pro -European among the member states, but current events show 
that the European issue is not so salient for the Bulgarian society and politi-
cal elite. The difficult social and political situation marginalises discussions 
about the functioning of the EU and the future of Europe. Not only the ab-
sence of Euroscepticism, but also the lack of any European issues in party 
manifestos is puzzling. This paper aims to answer the question if Bulgarian 
politicians are so pro -European or rather if Europe doesn’t really matter to 
the elites.
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Many scholars have already noticed that Euroscepticism has developed in Eastern Europe after the “big bang” EU enlargement of 2004, and it is often linked to 
the disappointment that some felt with the outcomes of transition as well as overgrown 
expectations that accompanied the accession to the European Union. The main aim of 
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the paper is to investigate if and how party -based Euroscepticism has been active in Bul-
garia, a post -communist country in CEE and a member of the European Union since 
2007. The paper will present the rhetoric and characteristics of main political parties 
in Bulgaria, as well as the evolution of the Eurosceptic arguments, and it will search for 
the anti -European postulates that are included in the programmes and political prac-
tice of the main Bulgarian political parties. Although Bulgarian public opinion used to 
be perceived as one of the most pro -European among the member states, current events 
show that the European issue is not so important for the Bulgarian society, and similar 
to other new member states, Bulgarian political parties seem to treat European elec-
tions as second order elections or even just as a test before the national ones. A difficult 
social and political situation marginalizes discussions about the functioning of the EU 
and the future of Europe. Not only the absence of Euroscepticism, but also the lack of 
any European issues in the party manifestos is puzzling. This paper aims to answer the 
question if Bulgarian politicians are so pro -European or rather if Europe doesn’t really 
matter to the elites.
INTRODUCTION
One of the outcomes of the 2014 European Parliament elections in all the member 
states is the relatively good performance of parties critical towards the European Union 
and European integration in general. This phenomenon is visible not only in the Old 
Member States, but also in the countries that joined EU during so called “big bang” 
enlargement of 2004 and 2007, as well as in the newest member state – Croatia, which 
became the 28th member of the EU only on 1 July 2013. I suggest that various factors 
(political, social, economic and cultural) are responsible for the development of Euro-
scepticism in the new member states of CEE. Some of these factors could be compared 
to ones found in the pre -enlargement EU -15, hence some of the determinants of Eu-
roscepticism might be present only in the countries of post -communist Europe. Still, 
Bulgaria seems to be the only EU country without a clearly defined Eurosceptic politi-
cal party – European elections of 2007, 2009 and the last ones of 2014 were treated 
as a “litmus test” of the popularity of the current government, but haven’t pointed to 
Eurosceptic political actors. Being treated as a domestic issue for the opposition in the 
EP campaign, the elections served as a measure of the possibility of winning the next 
parliamentary elections.
When discussing the election results, one should pay attention to the turnout rate. 
Low turnout during the European Parliament election is a general pattern, shared among 
almost all of the EU member states. It’s not different in the case of new member states –
Bulgaria among them. In 2014, the turnout was only 35.84%, which was similar to oth-
er post -communist countries and lower than the already low EU average of 42,54%.1 
1 European Parliament, Results of the 2014 European Elections, ‘Election Results’, 2014, at <http://www.
results -elections2014.eu/en/seats -member -state -absolut.html>, 10 September 2014.
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Similarly, in 2007 and 2009 the turnout was under the EU average – 29,22% and 
38,99% respectively.2
Lack of interest in the European issues might be an outcome of the domestic po-
litical situation. For over a year now Bulgaria has been hit by serious and long lasting 
anti -government street protests that are linked to the dismissal of Boyko Borissov’s gov-
ernment and the creation of a new one, which due to its policies has generated new pro-
tests and been dismissed just after 14 months, and new elections have been scheduled 
for October 2014. Since 2009, Borissov’s party GERB has ruled with support from 
three other parliamentary groups (including the nationalist party Ataka). The GERB 
government was in power till February 2013, when it submitted its resignation as a re-
sult of massive street protests. Early elections resulted in the formation of a new gov-
ernment by the Bulgarian Socialist Party and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, 
supported by the Ataka party and led by Prime Minister Plamen Oresharski. Soon af-
ter new protests started, mainly in the capital city – Sofia, they continued for several 
months and were considered the biggest and longest in Bulgaria’s recent history. On 
August 2014, Oresharski’s government was officially dissolved and the President ap-
pointed a new government that is supposed to lead Bulgaria through early elections in 
October 2014.3 Protesters demanded more transparent politics, fighting corruption ef-
fectively, applying rule of law and adherence to European law, as well as social reforms 
and raising the standard of living. European flags were used by the protesters next to 
Bulgarian ones.
Nowadays only 26% of Bulgarians trust the government and as few as 32% feel that 
the seven years of EU membership have brought positive change, while 51% do not 
believe that it has resulted in any significant change.4 With the political and economic 
situation becoming more exacerbated, one may assume that Bulgarians will attend Eu-
ropean Parliament elections either to express their attitudes – their dissatisfaction with 
membership in the European Union, or to support the EU as the only possible stim-
ulator of the domestic changes. Those opposing the EU and Bulgarian membership 
might voice concerns about the profits of membership, as the European Commission 
is regularly cutting or freezing funds and accusing Bulgarian government of ineffective 
reforms and corruption. European Union supporters are stressing the fact that Euro-
pean institutions are guarantors of the rule of law and that EU membership is the last 
possible stimulator of indispensable reforms. With these two oppositional stances, one 
might have anticipated an expressive campaign focused on European issues, but this did 
not happen. As it will be presented in the next paragraphs, not only was Eurosceptic 
rhetoric not very visible, but European matters in general were nearly invisible.
2 More about EP turnout: European Parliament, Results of the 2014 European Elections, ‘Elec-
tion Turnout’, at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/000cdcd9d4/Turnout-
-%281979 -2009%29.html>, 10 September 2014.
3 N. Popkostadinova, ‘Bulgaria Heads for Early Elections after EU Vote’, EUobserver, 19 VI 2014, at 
<http://euobserver.com/eu -elections/124652>, 19 June 2014.
4 Eadem, ‘Angry Bulgarians Feel EU Membership Has Brought Few Benefits’, EUobserver, 3 III 2014, 
at <http://euobserver.com/eu -elections/123199>, 3 March 2014.
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exPLAINING eUROSCePTICISM
Euroscepticism is a social and political phenomenon that was first noticed and which 
gained popularity in the United Kingdom, and it is generally associated with opposi-
tion towards European integration, rejecting the so -called European values and criticis-
ing European Union and its institutions in general5. However, Euroscepticism cannot 
be treated as a single ideology. One can find Euroscepticism in different forms, from 
nationalistic claims that European integration is a great danger to the nation state and 
national identity, to socialists who see a decrease in solidarity and in the risk -regulation 
system of the EU.6 As Vasilopoulou7 claims, Euroscepticism should be understood as 
a multidimensional phenomenon, as it can be directed at the system as a whole, to its 
institutional design, specific policies ( for example, enlargement, the euro), or the perceived 
general direction of the EU regulatory system, with the assessment of the latter being largely 
subjective.
As the term is vague and used both in academic and public discourse, researchers still 
are debating the best possible definition of the term. Taggart proposed to understand 
Euroscepticism as the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating 
outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration.8 Measuring the 
level and roots of Euroscepticism brought many different classifications of stances to-
ward European integration and the European Union.9 Szczerbiak and Taggart10 classify 
5 H. -J. Trenz, P. de Wilde, ‘Euro -Scepticism. Mapping a New Research Field for RECON’, RECON 
Working Papers, 2008, p. 1.
6 N. Styczyńska, ‘Euroscepticism in New Member States – The Case of Poland’, Contemporary European 
Studies, Special Issue (2009), p. 139.
7 S. Vasilopoulou, ‘Continuity and Change in the Study of Euroscepticism: Plus ca change?’, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Special Issue: Confronting Euroscepticism, Vol. 51, No. 1 (2013), p. 3.
8 P. Taggart, ‘A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Par-
ty Systems’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 33, No. 3 (1998), at <http://dx.doi.
org/10.1111/1475 -6765.00387>, p. 365.
9 Many scholars aimed to explain and classify Euroscepticism, typologies were proposed by Szczerbiak 
and Taggart (‘Theorizing Party -Based Euroscepticism: Problems of Definition, Measurement, and 
Causality’ in iidem (eds.), Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, Vol. 2: 
Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives, Oxford 2008; Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Pol-
itics of Euroscepticism, Vol. 1: Case Studies and Country Surveys, Oxford 2008; ‘A Touchstone of Dis-
sent…), Zuba (Polski eurosceptycyzm i eurorealizm, Opole 2006 (Studia i Monografie – Uniwersytet 
Opolski, nr 367)), Kopecký and Mudde (‘The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on Euro-
pean Integration in East Central Europe’, European Union Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3 (2002), at <http://
dx.doi.org/10.1177/1465116502003003002>) as well as Flood (‘Euroscepticism: A Problematic
Concept’. Paper presented at “32th UACES Annual Conference”, QU Belfast, 2002), Sorensen (Love 
Me, Love Me Not… A Typology of Public Euroscepticism, Brighton 2008 (SEI Working Paper, No. 101. 
EPERN Working Paper, No. 19)), Trenz and de Wilde (‘Euro -Scepticism…’) and Vasilopoulou (‘Euro-
pean Integration and the Radical Right: Three Patterns of Opposition’, Government and Opposition, 
Vol. 46, No. 3 (2011), at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477 -7053.2010.01337.x>) among others. 
10 A. Szczerbiak, P. Taggart, ‘Theorizing Party -Based Euroscepticism…’ 
205Politeja 1(33)/2015 (Non)Existence of Bulgarian…
Euroscepticism in two categories – they define the so -called soft and hard Euroscepti-
cism. Soft Eurosceptics do not oppose European integration in general, but criticise 
selected aspects of the European Union and are associated with “qualified” and “con-
tingent” opposition. Hard Euroscepticism refers to a general rejection of membership 
of the European Union, rejecting the entire European project.11 The division between 
hard and soft Eurosceptics proposed by Szczerbiak and Taggart was criticized for be-
ing too broad. The analytical model proposed by Kopecký and Mudde12 allows one to 
distinguish between those who constructively criticise the European Union, but do not 
negate the idea of European integration (Eurosceptics), from those who reject the very 
idea of the EU and demand withdrawal from the Union (Eurorejects). The Eurosceptic 
and Eurorealist rhetoric is often blurred, especially in public discourse. This is mainly 
due to oversimplified media coverage, but is also caused by a shift in rhetoric among 
particular individuals in the post -accession era from a Eurosceptic (EU -rejecting) posi-
tion to a more realistic position – questioning particular areas of integration.13 Flood14 
proposed a six -point continuum that includes rejectionists, revisionists, minimalists, 
gradualists, reformists and maximalists. This definition, although very complex, was 
not incorporated into the public discourse, probably because of its detail. Other defi-
nitions include that of Conti,15 that introduced the differentiation between hard Eu-
roscepticism, soft Euroscepticism, no commitment, functional Europeanism and iden-
tity Europeanism. Some scholars proposed a more concise way of categorizing attitudes 
towards European integration, such as Vasilopoulou, who mentions 3 categories of 
rejecting, conditional and compromising attitudes,16 or Sorensen,17 who focused on 
public -based Euroscepticism, identifying economic, sovereignty, democratic and socio-
-political types of Euroscepticism.
To better understand Euroscepticism, it must be analysed within the context of 
nation states. In the case of post -communist countries of Central and Eastern Eu-
rope, anti -European attitudes may be caused by disappointment with the economic 
and political transition, or might be linked to overgrown expectations that accom-
panied the accession to the European Union. Countries or the social groups which 
managed to make it through the transformation period successfully provided strong-
er support to European integration and the EU, than those who were faced with 
greater difficulties or still are in the process of transformation.18 Zuba classified a few 
11 Ibid.
12 P. Kopecký, C. Mudde, ‘The Two Sides of Euroscepticism…’ 
13 N. Styczyńska, ‘Bundle of Emotions. Polish Identity and Euroscepticism’ in R. Gura, N. Styczynska 
(eds.), Identités et espaces public européens, Paris 2014 (Local & Global).
14 Ch. Flood, ‘Euroscepticism: A Problematic Concept…’
15 N. Conti, Party Attitudes to European Integration. A Longitudinal Analysis of the Italian Case, Falmer 
2003 (SEI Working Paper, No. 70. EPERN Working Paper, No. 13).
16 S. Vasilopoulou, ‘European Integration and the Radical Right…’ 
17 C. Sorensen, Love Me, Love Me Not…
18 K. Zuba, Polski eurosceptycyzm…, p. 109.
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of the main fears concerning European integration, some of which were stronger in 
the post -Communist countries than in the old member states of the EU. However, 
universal fears can be found in both Western and Eastern Europe and usually focus 
on the issues of political sovereignty, culture and identity, which according to those 
opposing European integration, are threatened by the EU and the process of further 
and deeper integration. Central Eastern European fears referred to the anticipated 
cut -throat competition with the “old” member states mainly in the agriculture sec-
tor – this kind of threat was mostly seen in Poland, Slovenia and Latvia. The prob-
lem of weak and unadapted agriculture was combined with a fear of the repurchase 
of land by foreigners, a fear visible among almost all new member states, including 
Bulgaria.19
Some anti -EU arguments are the common ground for Euroscepticism and pop-
ulism, as these two trends often appear together on the political arena. In both dis-
courses, clear and extreme slogans are the key to bringing together all those disappoint-
ed by economic or political transformation, giving a clear picture of who is to blame. 
Populists using Eurosceptic rhetoric often argue that European integration is an elite 
project in which ordinary citizens have no say.20
IN SeARCH OF BULGARIAN PARTY ‑BASeD eUROSCePTICISM
In researching the rhetoric of the Bulgarian political parties, one may find arguments 
against EU accession that are concerned with economic issues (all economic and fi-
nancial implications of integration) as well as political and cultural ones. The latter 
ones are related to issues of sovereignty as well as cultural, religious and national iden-
tity. Had they appeared, Eurosceptic arguments of Bulgarian political parties would 
include economic and identity issues. Identity -based Euroscepticism is linked to the 
integration dilemma that involves a contradiction between national identity and Eu-
ropean identity and includes a fear of being “absorbed” by a supranational institution, 
therefore losing national sovereignty.21 This is visible not only in Bulgaria but also in 
many other countries of the region (e.g. Poland). Other and more politically driven 
arguments include immigration issues and joining the Schengen Area. The possibility 
of European institutions intervening in the domestic issues is also an important matter 
for the EU adversaries. Euroscepticism in Bulgaria (similarly to other post -communist 
countries, such as Poland or Hungary) is the domain of populist parties, especially the 
populist radical right, which perceives the EU as a threat to the national economy. It 
19 Ibid., pp. 113 -114.
20 E. Nalewajko, ‘Eurosceptyczne partie i ich liderzy w publicznej debacie o integracji prowadzonej w la-
tach 2000 -2003’ in L. Kolarska -Bobińska (ed.), Przed referendum europejskim. Absencja, sprzeciw, po-
parcie, Warszawa 2003 (Ekspertyzy, Rekomendacje, Raporty z Badań – Instytut Spraw Publicznych).
21 S. Riishoj, ‘Europeanization and Euroscepticism: Experiences from Poland and Czech Republic’ in R. 
Kanet (ed.), Identities, Nations and Politics after Communism, London 2008, p. 102 (Nations and Na-
tionalism of Eastern Europe and the Former USSR).
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uses nationalistic and xenophobic arguments, claiming that the main “enemies” of Bul-
garia are the Turkish and Roma minorities as well as European institutions that treat 
Bulgaria as a “second category member state”. This amalgam of Eurosceptic and xeno-
phobic attitudes may affect not only the domestic, but also European politics and inter-
national relations in the region. Still it is important to notice that Eurosceptic rhetoric 
and anti -European attitudes are marginal and do not constitute an important part of 
the political discourse.
The turning point for the Bulgarian political system was the return of the for-
mer Tsar Simeon Saxe -Coburg -Gotha to the country in spring 2001, and the quickly 
launched political movement called Movement Simeon the Second (NDSV), which 
gained an almost absolute majority in the Parliament. After elections in June 200122 
Simeon’s movement reshaped itself to be a party and in June 2007 changed its name to 
The National Movement for Stability and Progress. After gaining more than 42% of 
votes in the Parliament elections, Simeon II formulated a government in coalition with 
the Turkish minority party: Movement of Rights and Freedoms (DPS) and became 
the first royal in Europe to regain power in -line with democratic procedures. Interest-
ingly, until Simeon II’s comeback on the political scene, the Bulgarian party system fol-
lowed a classical bi -polar model, with a post -communist left (Bulgarian Socialist Party 
– BSP) and an anti -communist centre -right (The Union of Democratic Forces – SDS,
then after 1998 Alliance of Democratic Forces – ODS). For the first time after 2001,
the structure of the political competition changed, opposing both traditional parties
(BSP and SDS) to the newcomer NDSV23. Many scholars and publicists investigated
the phenomenon of NDSV’s rapid popularity, and they stressed the charisma of Tsar
Simeon II and his European background and equated that support that he was giv-
en with overall disappointment with the political elite among Bulgarian society24. Af-
ter 2001 a “populist wave” was rapidly cresting25 – in 2005, shortly before the general
elections Nacjonalen Sojuz ATAKA party was created by Volen Siderov. Shortly after
its creation, the party gained 21 seats out of 240 in the National Assembly. Ataka de-
veloped a radical right political discourse not only against the establishment but also
against minorities, utilizing nationalistic rhetoric on the defence of national interests
that included criticism towards the European Union and the accession negotiations.26
The party mobilized its supporters while taking to the streets and organizing public
meetings, manifestations and protests all around Bulgaria. Ataka entered the European
22 M. Spirova, ‘Consolidating the Post -communist Party Systems: Political Parties in Bulgaria’, 2003, at 
<http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/kokkalis/GSW5/spirova.pdf>. 
23 B. Cholova, ‘Populism in Bulgaria: A Recent Phenomenon?’. Paper presented on the “9th Belgian-
-Dutch Political Science Conference”, 27 -28 May, 2010, Leuven, Belgium, p. 12.
24 D. Smilov, ‘Bulgaria’ in G. Mesežnikov et al. (eds.), Populist Politics and Liberal Democracy in Central 
and Eastern Europe, Bratislava 2008; S. Andreev, ‘Is Populism the “Bad Wolf ”? Post -Accession Crisis 
of Representative Democracy in Bulgaria and Romania’. Paper presented at “Bringing Civil Society In”, 
International conference, EUI Florence, 13 -14 March 2009; B. Cholova, ‘Populism in Bulgaria…’
25 D. Smilov, ‘Bulgaria’.
26 B. Cholova, ‘Populism in Bulgaria…’, p. 16.
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Parliament in 2007, gaining 3 seats and together with other European populist parties, 
such as Austrian Freedom Party and French National Front, they formed the Tradition 
and Sovereignty (ITS) group in the European Parliament. Up till 2009, Ataka was an 
outsider on the Bulgarian political scene, criticized both by other parties and media for 
its radical xenophobic attitudes. In 2008 Siderov declared I want a new monolithic Bul-
garia, I want an end to the theft, I want a new policy on incomes and a revision of all the 
privatization deals and I want a stop to the construction of mosques, even in areas where 
Muslims live.27 Ataka declares the major enemies of the Bulgarian nation and state to 
be the Roma and Turks who are accused of causing the present bad economic situation 
of Bulgaria; moreover, Ataka labels the DPF party as an anti -systemic ethnic party, and 
calls for its prohibition28.
The political program called “20 Princliples of the Ataka Political Party” includes 
the anti -NATO declaration in point 13: Leaving NATO. Abstention from taking part 
in military unions. Total neutrality. No foreign military bases on Bulgarian territory and 
ends with a demand: Let’s bring Bulgaria back for the Bulgarians! Siderov called for re-
moving the Turkish -language news broadcasts from Bulgarian state television, which 
originally was a result of Bulgaria’s ratification of European human rights conven-
tions.29 Ataka won 2 seats in 2009 European Parliament elections and joined the Non-
-Attached group of the EP. In 2009 elections to the national Parliament Ataka gained 
9,5% of votes (21 seats) and decided to support the government established by Boyko 
Borissov and his party GERB. In the 2013 earlier elections to the Parliament Ataka 
managed to collect 7,3% of votes, that means that more than 250 000 Bulgarians sup-
ported their nationalistic and xenophobic rhetoric. In 2013, the National Front for 
Bulgaria’s Salvation which splintered from Ataka in 2011, took part in the elections 
and gained 3,7 percent of votes. As Tucker30 argues, this proves that radical nationalist 
vote actually increased from 9,4% in 2009 to 11% in 2013 (if we count votes for Ataka 
and National Front for Bulgaria’s Salvation together).
The party called Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) was 
launched by Boyko Borissov, the mayor of Sofia and former Secretary General of 
the Ministry of Interior in 2006. He gained popularity while being a mayor of the 
capital, Sofia, declaring efforts to fight organized crime. Thanks to Borissov’s cha-
risma and populist anti -elite and anti -mafia rhetoric in 2007, the party scored well 
27 P. Kostadinov, ‘A Message from Siderov’, Sofia Echo, 9 May 2008, at <http://sofiaecho.
com/2008/05/09/660554_a -message -from -siderov>, 9 August 2009. 
28 M. Smrčková, ‘Comparison of Radical Right -Wing Parties in Bulgaria and Romania: The National 
Movement of Ataka and the Great Romania Party’, Central European Political Studies Review, Vol. 11, 
No. 1 (2009), p. 55.
29 B. DeDominicis et al., ‘Repertoires of Contention of the Bulgarian Nationalist Right: Militant Na-
tionalism, Social Movements and European State -Building in Post -Colonial Bulgaria’. Paper prepared 
for the “International Society of Political Psychology Annual Conference”, 14 -17 July 2009, Trinity 
College, Dublin, Ireland, p. 5.
30 J. Tucker ‘Post -Election Report: 2013 Bulgarian Parliamentary Elections’, The Monkey Cage, 20 
May 2013, at <http://themonkeycage.org/2013/05/20/post -election -report -2013 -bulgarian-
-parliamentary -elections/>.
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(21% of votes) in the European and local elections and finally won the 2009 general 
elections, gaining 116 seats out of 240 and allowing it to form its own government, 
although without a majority in the Parliament (but supported by nationalist Ata-
ka). GERB also won the 2009 elections to the European Parliament gaining 5 seats 
(more than 24 percent of votes) and joined the European People’s Party in the EP. 
As Cholova stressed, Borissov as mayor of Sofia developed a classical populist rheto-
ric, criticizing the governing parties for the lack of efficiency and bad management, he 
called the other parties “they” and emphasized that his priorities are not words but 
“deeds”.31 DeDominicis et al state that Borissov’s charisma stems partly from the per-
ception that he, as a former police official, knows and understands the world of official 
corruption and has both the will and the skill to fight it.32 Nowadays GERB is not so 
radical in its rhetoric and declares being a moderate and pro -European party, which 
has as its main aim the fight against corruption and the improvement of the stand-
ard of life of the average Bulgarian. Nonetheless, some xenophobic attitudes can be 
easily found in the speeches of GERB’s politicians. While visiting the USA, Borissov 
referred to a huge number of Bulgarian immigrants and stated that Bulgaria was left 
with bad “human material” consisting of “one million Roma, 700 000 Turks, 2,5 mil-
lion retirees”. Although GERB declares to be a center -right conservative party, and at 
the same time pro -European, it is constantly adapting some of the Ataka’s postulates, 
taking over some part of Ataka’s protest votes as well. The EU is not discussed often, 
however, it is mentioned in the foreign policy section of the party programme, argu-
ing that Bulgaria’s foreign relations must be expanded to include not only the EU but 
also other states.33
As stated above, since the 2014 EP elections the main Eurosceptic political party 
in Bulgaria was Attack (Ataka), having 3 and 2 MEPs in the 2007 and 2009 elections 
respectively. During the 2014 European Parliament election campaign the Ataka party 
did not dedicate much space in its electoral programme to Europe, indicating that the 
issue is of low salience. The programe of the party – called the 20 Principles of the Ataka 
Political Party refers to the EU when raising issues concerning economic solutions. Ac-
cording to the party manifesto every Bulgarian investor, entrepreneur, and/or manufac-
turer shall have precedence over any foreign one, up until Bulgaria’s living standards reach 
the average European level. Bulgaria’s production, commerce, banks and all other means 
of production should be in Bulgarian hands.34 The party claims the need of introducing 
the minimum labour pay by law with hourly wages corresponding to the average European 
ones and calls for reconsideration of the closed chapters in the accession negotiations with 
the EU; renegotiation of all unfavourable clauses, damaging Bulgaria’s interest. This in-
cludes the cancellation of any agreements, accords or memoranda implying or demanding 
31 B. Cholova, ‘Populism in Bulgaria…’, p. 14.
32 B. DeDominicis et al., ‘Repertoires of Contention…’, pp. 30 -31.
33 Ataka Party official web page, 2009, at <http://www.ataka.bg>.
34 Ataka Party programme 2014, see: Ataka Party, 20 Principles of ATAKA Political Party, 2014, at 
<http://www.ataka.bg/en/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14&Itemid=27>.
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the decommissioning of the Kozlodui Nuclear Power Plant.35 This indicates that although 
the party is a fervent supporter of national sovereignty, it indirectly accepts the exist-
ence of the EU, yet calls for renegotiation of the accession treaty and seeks to reinforce 
foreign relations with other states. It does not wish for Bulgaria’s withdrawal from the 
EU. It is important to mention that while backing the ruling parties, Ataka managed 
to push a ban on land sale to foreign citizens, despite EU regulations in this respect, 
and supported the decision to construct a border fence to keep Syrians and other im-
migrants in Turkey.36
When examining the party manifestos during the 2014 European Parliament elec-
tion campaign, one may be surprised how little (or nothing) they propose on the Euro-
pean issues. As Anthony Georgieff points out, none of Bulgarian parties standing in the 
European Union elections in 2014 – except the Ataka party, which claimed to oppose 
“Euro -perversion”, meaning same -sex partnership rights – had any stand on any of the 
major issues Europe was faced with.37
With low turnout, GERB gathered 30,4% of the votes, compared to 18,9% for 
the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). The Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) 
gained 17,27%, which was considered a big success, especially since the party is expe-
riencing heavy critique from the right wing political scene. The Coalition Reformist 
Block (RB) consisting of 5 small parties, gained one seat (6,45% of votes). The big-
gest looser of the 2014 elections was doubtlessly Ataka. Apart from good results in 
2007 and 2009, Ataka gained only 2,96% in 2014 EP elections.
Still, there is one more political coalition that appeared just before the elec-
tions and managed to win 2 of the 17 seats assigned for Bulgaria in the EP (gain-
ing 10,66% of votes). The coalition is composed of small parties and movements: 
Bulgaria Without Censorship, Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation-
-Bulgarian National Movement, Agrarian People’s Union and St. George’s Day 
movement.
The coalition is led by Nikolay Barekov, who is a former journalist and support-
er of Boyko Borisov. The political programme of the coalition is populist, and for 
example promises to reintroduce conscription and to reinstate the Communist -era 
name of the country, the People’s Republic of Bulgaria,38 provide free medicine for 
children, set up state -owned companies for the purpose of buying off and process-
ing agricultural produce, abolish flat income tax and reintroduce progressive income 
tax. Although the views on Europe and European integration remain mostly unclear, 
both of the MEPs representing the coalition joined the ECR political group.
35 Ibid.
36 N. Popkostadinova, ‘Angry Bulgarians…’
37 A. Georgieff, ‘Dark Cloud Tiny Silver Lining’, Vagabond, Issue 92, at <http://www.vagabond.bg/pol-
itics/item/2769 -dark -cloud -with -tiny -silver -lining.html>.
38 Ibid.
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CONCLUSIONS
Bulgaria might be considered a trouble -maker – not only in the eyes of European in-
stitutions that must coordinate, lead and assess Bulgaria to account for what they have 
achieved in the area of domestic reforms, but also for researchers tracing Eurosceptic at-
titudes in the party politics of the Member States. It seems that the European issue is not 
on the top of the political agenda in Bulgaria, and we may risk the assumption that this 
is because European issues are not of such great importance for Bulgarian citizens as well.
The feeling of distrust towards politics is a general attitude of Bulgarian society, and 
the EU might be perceived by part of the citizens as a last and only guarantor of stabil-
ity and the rule of law. As Tismaneanu argues in Eastern Europe the point of historical 
reference is the former communist regime: the new elites are accused of being “the old elites 
with new masks”,39 thus the external structures might be seen as a possible provider of 
a positive change, being still supported by a bigger group of citizens than the domestic 
institutions. On the other hand, Bulgarian society is not interested in European issues 
and despite a positive approach towards European institutions, has little knowledge 
about their performance and rules of conduct.
Seven years after Bulgarian accession to the European Union, one may observe some 
parties using Eurosceptic rhetoric, but none of them has built its programme around 
European issues. Even though the Bulgaria Without Censorship coalition used some 
Eurosceptic arguments, the general attitude towards the EU is pragmatic. This pragma-
tism is a part of a political strategy, as strong anti -EU stances are not popular in Bul-
garia. Bulgarians are rather pro -European, and the level of trust towards the EU institu-
tions is much higher than towards the national ones. Eurobarometer polls demonstrate 
that Bulgaria is among the countries which are most optimistic about the future of the 
EU (61% optimistic and 27% pessimistic), while the EU average is 53% optimistic, ver-
sus 40% pessimistic. Although part of the society declares pro -Russian attitudes and 
claims that joining the Eurasian Union would be a better choice than being a member 
of the EU, supporters of such opinions are naturally more willing to support Euroscep-
tic political parties.
The absence of Euroscepticism in public and political discourse might be interpret-
ed as a general lack of interest in European issues that is accompanied and determined 
by a deficit of knowledge about European Union and its functioning. However, a posi-
tive outcome of the EP 2014 elections in Bulgaria is the fact that Ataka and other ex-
tremist organisations such as the National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria, which 
used xenophobic and nationalist rhetoric failed to win any seats in the European Par-
liament. This is not only another inverse trend compared to other European countries, 
but also a sign that there are limits to extreme positions in Bulgarian public and politi-
cal discourse.
39 V. Tismaneanu, Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in Post -Communist Societies, 
Princeton 1998, p. 527.
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